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The safety of seafarers and passengers and the protection of the marine environment can be 
enhanced by timely and accurate reports identifying the circumstances and causes of marine 
casualties and incidents. These reports can lead to greater awareness of casualty causation and 
result in remedial measures for the purpose of enhancing safety of life at sea and protection of the 
marine environment. This “review paper” collects several contributions presented through the 
years in different STAB events. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As it is mentioned by IMO, Resolution 
A849(20), the safety of seafarers and 
passengers and the protection of the marine 
environment can be enhanced by timely and 
accurate reports identifying the circumstances 
and causes of marine casualties and incidents. 
The investigation and proper analysis of 
marine casualties and incidents can lead to 
greater awareness of casualty causation and 
result in remedial measures for the purpose of 
enhancing safety of life at sea and protection 
of the marine environment. 
This Resolution introduces the “Code for 
the investigation of marine casualties and 
incidents”. This Code recognizes that under 
IMO conventions each flag State has a duty to 
conduct an investigation into any casualty 
occurring to any its ships when judges that 
such an investigation may assist in 
determining what changes in the present 
regulations may be desirable or if such 
casualty has produced a major deleterious 
effect upon the environment. 
Through the diverse Proceedings of the 
STAB Conferences/Workshops, many papers 
dealing with ship accidents, mainly related 
with stability, have been presented. Although 
they are not “official reports” can shed light 
about the cause of the incident and increase the 
knowledge about the ship safety. 
Many of these contributions are presented 
in this “review paper”. 
   
STAB 1975 (Glasgow) 
Tanker,  EDITH TERKOL  
A small Danish tanker, “EDITH 
TERKOL” (Kure, 1975), having GZ-curves 
complying with the IMO recommendations 
capsized in the Baltic Sea near the Swedish 
island of Goland. She was on a ballast journey 
and steamed south in a stern quartering sea. In 
between she rolled rather heavily and suddenly 
she capsized. The weather had strength of 
Beaufort 6-7. Only two persons survived. 
After model tests and different numerical 
considerations the final hypothesis concludes 
that the ship was rolling moderately in stern 
quartering seas. The GZ-curve was varying as 
the waves overtook the ship in a non-harmonic 
way causing the particular motion from one 
side to the other which should end up as the 
ship’s ultimate half roll to have much reduced 
righting levers. This caused a continuous 
lagging of the roll motion behind the sway and 
yaw motion. The lagging disturbed the balance 
between the large wave exciting moment and 
the large sway acceleration moment existing in 
the harmonic motion, where they almost 
completely cancelled each other out. The new 
resultant of these two, outweighs the 
remaining righting levers and accelerates the 
roll motion into capsize. 
STAB 1982 (Tokyo) 
Hotel Platform “Alexander L. Kielland” 
The “ALEXANDER L. KIELLAND” was 
originally built as a drilling rig, but had always 
served as an accommodation platform for the 
Ekofish field in the North Sea. There had been 
four modifications in which new containers 
were mounted on the deck, forward of the 
drilling tower.  
It was a pentagone type platform. The 
buoyancy came from five individual 
columns/pontoons supported by a system of 
bracings. The lower horizontal bracings were 
free-flooded, the other ones were watertight. 
On the 27th of March 1980 at about 6.30 
p.m. one of the supporting columns broke off 
when the platform was in service. The failure 
started with a fatigue crack  in bracing D-6, the 
five other bracings connecting column D to the 
platform subsequently failed from 
overloading, resulting in a total loss of column 
D. The platform almost immediately heeled 
over to an angle of 30-35 degrees. From this 
position it continued slowly to heel and sink, 
until it capsized after about 20 minutes. Out of 
the 212 men onboard, 123 lost their lives. 
Columns C and E were submerged, and it 
is thought that down flooding took place 
through the doors and ventilators of these 
columns. However, considering the rapidity 
with which the platform capsized, there is also 
a possibility that flooding took place through 
openings caused by structural damage. This 
income of water would imply that half of the 
deck space would be filled by then. 
The paper on the capsizing of this platform 
(Rusaas, 1982), dealt with some aspects and 
circumstances of the described accident. 
It was assumed that the mooring system 
delayed the capsizing only for a few minutes 
and that it was not possible to prevent the 
capsizing by a redistribution of ballast because 
the power supply failed when the platform 
heeled over. 
The calculations showed that the platform 
capsized due to progressive flooding in the 
deck structure. The capsizing occurred when 
the filling reached about 75-80% of the 
available space. 
It was also suggested in that study that 
semi-submersibles should have a reserve of 
buoyancy in the deck, since the calculations 
made after the capsizing showed that without 
buoyancy in the deck structure, the platform 
would capsize at any loss in the supporting 
system. 
STAB 1986 (Gdansk, Poland) 
Large Stern Trawler 
On 6th January 1982, a large stern trawler 
of 549 gross tonnage, similar to the “GAUL”, 
   
capsized and founded during hauling a net in 
the Bering Sea. Out of 33 crews on board, 32 
members lost their lives and only third officer 
was saved by her friend ship. 
The vessel had two decks between which 
there was a large fish processing factory, and 
there were two openings called garbage shoots 
on the sides in the factory. There was no 
testimony concerning whether those garbage 
shoots were closed or left open.  
Model experiments on ship motions in her 
various intact and flooded conditions were 
explained in the paper presented (Kan, 1986). 
These experiments did not show any evidence 
of poor seakeeping. Measurements of intact 
stability showed a good agreement with the 
calculation which met the criteria with a 
substantial margin. Stabilities with the free 
water in the factory and in process of flooding 
trough the garbage shoots were also measured, 
and besides capsizing tests of the initially 
heeled model with open garbage shoots were 
performed. From these results and other 
examinations, including the testimony of the 
survivor, it was concluded that the capsizing 
had been caused by water flooding through the 
unclosed garbage shoots into the factory and 
then, probably into the fish hold. 
“RF2” rescue vessel 
The self-righting ability of the almost new-
built rescue vessel RF2 was analysed in the 
presented paper (Guldhammer, 1986). This 
boat capsized in Skagerak in 1981, with the 
loss of 6 men. Investigation proved that the 
stability was substantially less than desired. 
However, the accident was explained as being 
due to bad circumstances. 
The vessel left station at Hirstshals to 
search for survivors from a cutter. Before 
“RF2” managed to terminate action and return 
safely to the harbour, she was struck just 
outside the harbour by a breaking wave, lifted 
on the wave crest only to fall down in the 
trough at the same time heeling 90º to the port 
side. The vessel was not able to right her-self, 
and some seconds later turned upside down. 
When the vessel was turned to even keel, it 
was discovered that the entire top of the wheel 
house was torn away and the two windows in 
the port side plus a few more blown in. The 
hull, however, was almost intact. 
The appearance of an amateur film from 
the self-righting test renewed the 
investigations. The analysis of this film 
concluded that the test as in fact carried out 
was no proof of stability.  
STAB 1994 (Florida, EEUU) 
RO-Ro ships in waves 
The paper presented in 1994 (Jiambo, 
1994) provided a compilation of some of the 
most significant capsizing accidents performed 
by Ro-Ro ships during the decades of the 80s 
and 90s in Europe. 
Among these we can find the “ZENOBIA”, 
she which capsized in 1980 as a consequence 
of load shifting onboard caused by an 
uncontrollable manoeuvre motion. 
The “HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE”, 
which capsized outside the port of Zeebrugge 
(Belgium) on her route to Dover in 1987, over 
180 human lives were lost. The reason for the 
capsize was that the ferry was trimmed by bow 
and had the bow doors open so that the water 
got ingress to the car deck as the ship’s speed 
increased. 
 The “VINCA GORTHON” was a Ro-Ro 
ship for paper product transport from Sweden 
to the European Continent, and she sank in 
1988 due to the load shifting caused by the 
simultaneous effect of vertical and horizontal 
acceleration, and roll motion at a moderate 
sea. 
 The “JAN HEWELIUSZ” capsized under 
a severe storm over the Baltic sea in 1993. 
Fifty-five lives were lost in the accident.   
The result presented in that paper is a 
theoretical study showing that Ro-Ro ships can 
be subjected to the parametrically excited roll 
motion not only in regular but also in irregular 
   
waves. It was also mention that the study of  
the dynamic stability problems of a RoRo ship 
in waves must consider the combination of 
model tests and computer-simulation.  
“STARTS PRIDE II” fishing vessel 
The paper on the capsizing of the fishing 
vessel “STRAITS PRIDE II” (Bass, 1994) 
analysed the importance of paravanes with 
regards to the stability of a ship, and 
considered them as an element to be taken into 
account during the design process. This study 
focused on the capsizing of this small fishing 
vessel, which partially lost the side paravane in 
the capsize, and pointed at other capsizes 
where the paravane was considered to be a 
contributing factor. 
Although the results of the experiments did 
not show the moment generated by the single 
paravane as responsible for the capsizing, it 
was possible that it was so for the ingress of 
water into the fish hold, and the subsequent 
shift of the fish cargo.  In any case, the study 
suggested that the cause for the capsize was a 
complex interaction of a number of factors 
associated with asymmetric roll, wind, drift, 
the single paravane deployment, and the 
movement of water and fish in the fish hold. 
In this capsizing there were two factors to 
be taken into consideration in subsequent 
studies: the additional roll damping added to 
the vessel by the paravane, assumed as an 
increase of stability; and the significant 
modification of the roll of the vessel under 
certain conditions due to the paravane, 
considered, in this case, as a lack of stability.   
It was not certain that freeing the vessel of 
the paravane would have saved her from 
capsizing, but it was clear that paravanes do 
affect the roll damping and therefore the 
dynamic stability of small fishing vessels.  
STAB 1997 (Varna) 
General Cargo Ship 
A general cargo ship sank in front of the 
Catalonia Coast ( Spain ) after two hours of 
her departure, the weather conditions being 
excellent. The accident was investigated by 
both port authorities and the service company 
involved. Studies on ship buoyancy and 
stability were performed, in order to determine 
the causes of the capsizing, and the conditions 
in the moment of the loss. Those studies were 
analysed in the paper presented by Prof. 
Sagarra (Sagarra 1997). Some of the 
conclusions reached, pointed to the loading 
condition and the stability situation of the ship 
as the main hypothesis of the capsizing. 
The information given by the port 
authorities revealed that the ship was 
overloaded at her departure, with an extra 
weight of 370 T, and that she arrived at the 
port with ballast, which made her trim  aft. 
Both the ballast water formerly carried and 
the extra weight on board made the ship leave 
port overloaded and she did not reach the 
minimum stability criteria established by the 
IMO. These studies showed the deficiency of 
stability as the main reason for the loss of the 
ship. 
The studies concluded that the ship did not 
have enough reserve of stability to confront a 
cruise and therefore could not recover from a 
small heel, which made her heel over 
completely until she sunk.  
Purse Seiner  
A purse seiner capsized in beam seas, in 
East China in 1993. There was only one 
survivor and the cause and process of the 
capsizing are still unknown nowadays. An 
experimental study was carried out with a 
model in order to clarify whether the fishing 
net resulted in a shift capable of capsizing the 
vessel or not. (Shin, 1997) 
It was known that the seiner was inclined 
for a few minutes before capsizing, and that 
condition caused shipping water to accumulate 
on the deck and the net on the deck to shift in 
the same direction. However, also to be taken 
into account was the fact that the net was not 
fixed on the deck when the storm reached the 
vessel and shipping spray occurred frequently 
on the deck and starboard deck which made 
   
the ship roll to starboard, increasing more and 
more the inclination. In the end, the vessel 
inclined more than 25 degrees to the starboard, 
was incapable of restoring her upright 
condition, and finally capsized. 
The model was tested in the upright 
condition and two inclined positions: 5 and 10 
degrees. The capsizing experiment revealed 
that the purse seiner did not capsize in the 
upright condition, and although she did in the 
inclined positions, it was normally due to the 
shipping water which had accumulated on the 
deck. 
 The testing concluded that the inclined 
condition caused shipping water on the deck 
and developed into the capsizing. There was 
also a possibility that a slight inclined 
condition due to a shift of the fishing net led to 
the capsizing. The purse seiner capsized easily 
even if the metacentric height was enough to 
maintain stability in the upright condition. 
 
STAB 2000 (Launceston) 
Racing Yatch “MARINE” 
On December 30, 1991 the racing yacht 
“MARINE” capsized when sailing from Japan 
to Guam due to the breakage of her fin-keel at 
its root. Eight lives were lost in the accident.  
The study presented (Kagemoto 2000) 
showed the results of the investigation on the 
possibility of the loss of the fin-keel due to 
severe weather conditions.  
A model was constructed to measure the 
force and the moment acting on the fin-keel. 
Numerical calculations were also conducted 
and the results were compared with the 
experimental data obtained in a wave tank. 
The items measured in the experiments were 
motions of the model and the force/moment 
acting on the fin-keel. 
A yacht is designed to possess a large 
restoring moment, and so its resonant period is 
shorter than that of conventional ships. This 
suggests that the roll motion is the dominant 
cause of the lateral force and moment on a fin-
keel. 
By means of the comparisons between the 
experimental results and the theoretical 
calculations on the force and the moment that 
will act on fin-keels, it was concluded that 
these could be well predicted by the theoretical 
calculations based on the linear potential 
theory. However, the predictions of the force 
and the moment that may have acted on the 
yacht at the time of her capsizing might be 
considered to be meaningful. 
The investigation showed that it was very 
unlikely that the moment or the vertical force 
reached large enough values so as to break the 
fin-keel of the “MARINE” off her canoe body 
in the sea state as reported at the time of the 
accident. The results indicated that the 
moment should have been twice the value of 
the largest moment expected. This fact implied 
that either the fin-keel did not have the 
expected structural strength or she encountered 
certain extreme loads such as an impact load 
caused by breaking waves. 
Coastwise chemical Tanker 
  A coastwise chemical tanker sailing at full 
ahead capsized in calm waters while turning.  
The paper published on this subject (Sadakane, 
2000) investigated the reasons of the accident, 
and judged the possibility of the capsizing 
trough the static righting arm weakened by the 
free surface effect of the cargo, and the 
influence of the low freeboard, that could 
endure the external heeling moment caused by 
turning. 
Coastwise tankers have some typical 
characteristics relating to the transverse 
stability. For example, the freeboard is very 
low, causing the shipping of water on the 
upper deck which arises the centre of gravity 
and alters the trim. The cargo is a liquid with 
free surface that moves in wide tanks. In the 
case that the liquid is of high density, the 
stability loss due to the free surface effect 
appears more clearly. 
   
A proper correction for the free surface 
effect of the liquid cargo was not performed in 
the initial design stage, and the quantity of the 
righting arm loss was quite different by 
correcting the free surface effect. The liquid 
cargo shift occurred when the ship turned and 
a significant outward heel moment was 
generated. 
The shipped water, caused not only by 
wind waves but also by the ship own waves, 
increased the trim of the ship by flowing 
towards the low end. The trim made the 
freeboard lower. The righting arm was enough 
until the upper deck edge immersed. 
There were two possible explanations for 
the capsizing: either the static righting arm 
weakened by the free surface effect or the 
influence of the low freeboard could not hold 
the external heel moment caused by turning. 
WORKSHOP 2002 (New York)  
Post-Panamax Container Ship 
In October, 1998 a C11 class post-panamax 
container ship, eastbound in the north Pacific 
from Kaohsiung to Seattle, was overtaken by a 
severe storm. She carried a deck stow of some 
1300 containers. As encounter with the storm 
became inevitable, the master hove to ride out 
the rough seas and winds. About 400 
containers were lost overboard and another 
400 collapsed or crushed during these motions. 
During the period of severest motions, port 
and starboard rolling of as much as 35 to 40 
degrees was reported simultaneously with 
extreme pitching. 
The C11 class vessels are 262 m LBP, 40 
m Beam, and 24.25 m Depth with a loaded 
draft of about 12.5 m. Pre-construction model 
testing indicated no significant rolling in head 
and bow quartering seas. 
An extensive investigation was undertaken 
to determine whether head-sea parametric 
rolling could have been the cause of the 
vessel’s extreme motions. This investigation, 
and its results were explained in the paper 
presented (France, 2002). Initially, computer 
modelling was carried out using nonlinear, 
time domain programs developed by the 
Maritime Institute of the Netherlands 
(MARIN) and by Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC). Both 
programs predicted rolling between 30 and 40 
degrees for the vessel in the head seas 
encountered. 
Vessels with flat transom sterns and 
significant bow flare are most prone to 
parametric rolling, due to the large variations 
in stability these vessels undergo in head and 
near head seas. Bow flare is also of importance 
due to the righting energy introduced at 
maximum roll angle, when ship is pitched 
down by the head. 
It was also found that parametric rolling in 
head seas introduced loads into on-deck 
container stacks and their securing systems 
well in excess of those derived from 
classification society guidelines, or predicted 
though linear seakeeping analysis. The large 
roll amplitudes that are developed and the in-
phase relationship of pitch and roll 
accelerations are of particular importance.   
This case point out that the head-sea 
parametric rolling might be relatively common 
although otherwise unfamiliar to mariners and 
vessel operators.  
Fishing Vessel “ARTIC ROSE” 
On April 2, 2001 the 92 ft fishing vessel 
“ARTIC ROSE” disappeared in the Bering 
Sea, killing all fifteen men onboard. The US 
Coast Guard convened a Formal Marine Board 
of Investigation (FMBI) to determine what 
happened to the ship. 
The Marine Safety Center (MSC) provided 
naval architecture supported to the FMBI 
throughout their investigation, which was 
detailed in the paper (Borlase 2002). . 
According to the analysis, the most likely 
reason the “ARTIC ROSE” sank was 
progressive flooding from the weather deck to 
the processing space through an open door 
connecting the two areas, and the flooding 
   
then progressed to the galley, fish hold and 
engine room through non-watertight doors and 
hatches. 
Water on deck often led to progressive 
flooding into spaces inside the fishing vessel 
in which watertight doors and hatches had 
been left open, which was precisely the 
scenario the author believed most likely 
caused the loss of the “ARTIC ROSE”. 
In order to compute the capsize resistance 
of the ship, the MSC calculated the non-linear 
safe basin erosion for different frequencies. 
Using a digitized underwater hull model, the 
inertia, added mass, non-linear damping, and 
wave force terms were calculated. 
The results showed the “ARTIC ROSE” 
most likely capsized between 1 minute 40 
second and 2 minutes 40 seconds after 
progressive flooding began, due largely to the 
free surface effect of the water trapped inside 
the vessel. 
STAB 2003 (Madrid) 
Ro-Ro Passenger Ferry “EXPRESS 
SAMINA” 
The Ro-Ro passenger ferry “EXPRESS 
SAMINA” sank at the entranceways to the 
port of the island of Paros in September 26, 
2000. Over eighty people died in the accident. 
The ship collided with a rocky islet on 
starboard sideways. It caused damages both 
below and above waterline. 
Immediately following the collision, water 
started pouring through the fin damage 
opening into the main engine room and 
progressively into the other compartments 
through open left watertight doors.  
The objective of the investigation was to 
clarify the causes of the collision, the way of 
flooding and foundering of the ship. A series 
of studies were carried out to check the 
compliance of the ship with the relevant 
regulations and, as far as the ship’s damage 
stability characteristics are concerned, it was 
confirmed that the ship complied with the 
provisions of EUROSOLAS regulatory 
framework. 
The investigation into the sinking, and 
specifically the ship’s damage stability 
behaviour were outlined in the paper 
(Papanikolaou, 2003). 
There were two significant results of the 
used numerical simulation method, the 
flooding sequence of the compartments and 
the time series of the various incurred events, 
including ship’s motion and sinking. In the 
simulation analysis the effect of shift of cargo 
was also considered, since the ship obtained 
large heeling angles and the not lashed cars on 
ship’s car deck fell to the side. 
The employment of a nonlinear time 
domain simulation method facilitated the 
identification of the most probable flooding 
scenario, the ship’s heeling time history and 
the estimation of the time sinking. Progressive 
flooding through open left watertight doors 
was found to be the main reason for ship’s 
sinking. 
Fishing Vessel “RYUHO MARU no.5” 
The Japanese offshore trawler “RYUHO 
MARU NO.5” capsized off the Erimo Cape of 
Hokkaido on September 11, 2000, while 
hauling a fishing net. Fourteen men out of 
eighteen lost their lives in the accident. 
The main factors related to the accident 
were hauling much amount of fish on the 
upper deck, rough manoeuvring, shift of 
unlashed items on board and shift of the cod 
end with fish over the inner bulwark. The 
effects of each factor on the stability and on 
the heeling moment of the ship were evaluated 
through a parametric study described in the 
paper (Taguchi, 2003) 
Stability calculations were carried out with 
trim free condition. The free surface effect in 
fuel oil tanks was taken into account and so 
the shift of the centre of gravity due to the 
shifting of fuel oil. 
   
Hauling much amount of fish onboard 
raised the centre of gravity of the vessel and 
reduced the stability. This led to a reduced 
freeboard and a large trim by stern, therefore 
the flooding angle on the aft part of the hull 
was reduced. 
The outward heeling moment by turning of 
the vessel was smaller than the heeling 
moment due to shift of the cod end, but it 
keeps working along the capsizing motion, so 
its effect becomes very large. 
The accident was considered to be caused 
be the combination of all the mentioned 
factors: hauling much amount of fish, rough 
manoeuvring, unlashed items on deck and the 
shift of the cod end with fish over the inner 
bulwark. 
 WORKSHOP 2005 (Istambul) 
Small size LPG tanker 
A small size LPG tanker was found in a 
capsized position by a Danish ship near 
Calamata bay off the coast of Mora Peninsula 
in the Mediterranean Sea on March 25, 1969. 
Seventeen people perished in the tragic 
accident. A committee of experts was 
established to investigate the accident. 
The tanker had no cargo at the time of 
accident, but the ballast and fore peak were 
full. The capsize took about two minutes 
without wild rolling. The roll period was 
claimed to be long and the roll motion was 
slow. 
Although stability of the tanker complied 
with the IMO standards (based on SOLAS 
1966), her stability in waves needed to be 
checked since it was in rough seas at the time 
of capsize. The IMO weather criterion was 
applied to the design loading conditions. When 
the requirements of weather criterion were 
compared with the results, it was seen that 
although all the cases met the roll area 
requirement, three of the cases failed to meet 
list angle requirement. That meant that the 
tanker was not fully in compliance with the 
IMO weather criterion. 
Another aspect of the capsize was the loss 
of stability especially on wave crest. It was 
found that the stability was reduced greatly on 
wave crest with compared to calm water 
stability. 
Main aims of the paper presented (Taylan, 
2005), were drawing attention to technological 
evolution in ship science and engineering and 
the response of International organizations 
such as IMO and classification societies to this 
evolution. 
STAB 2006 (Rio de Janeiro) 
“O BAHÍA” fishing vessel 
A small purse seiner capsized in June 2004 
near Sisargas Islands in the North of Spain. 
The ship was sailing in following seas with 
significant wave height when she suddenly 
capsized and sunk without any previous 
distress communication. There were no 
survivors among the ten members of the crew. 
The circumstances in which the ship was 
sailing were considered as dangerous 
according to the IMO guidelines. This and the 
suddenness of the capsizing clearly indicate 
that the accident might have been a 
consequence of the sea condition. 
Model tests in regular and irregular waves 
(Maron, 2006) were carried out at CEHIPAR 
in wave condition similar to those known to 
exist at the time of the accident. A model boat 
was built reproducing underwater hull and also 
superstructure. She was provided with bulwark 
ports and their closures, which reproduced 
those in the shipwrecked vessel. The model 
ship was loaded to reproduce the accident’s 
displacement, but also the longitudinal and 
transverse inertia, and proper GM. 
At first, only irregular tests were taken. 
However, the initial results suggested the 
convenience of trying also with some specific 
regular waves. Therefore, the model was tested 
in regular wave fields with height and 
amplitudes with a low but appreciable 
probability of appearance. Only one of the 
tested waves resulted in the capsizing of the 
   
model. The probability of occurrence of a 
similar wave was about 2%. 
It was concluded that the capsizing could 
have been the result of a loss of stability in 
following seas accompanied by massive water 
shipping on the working deck. It could be 
argued that the ship was not in regular waves, 
but the numerical simulation shows that when 
a big wave appears, the previous and the 
following waves have similar characteristics. 
Cruising Yatch 
On 15 September, 2003 a cruising yacht 
sunk in Lake Biwa in Japan. Seven of the 
twelve members of the crew drowned. An 
investigation on the accident was carried out 
using a model in order to identify the time-to-
sink, and stability calculations, with and 
without water inside the yacht. The results 
indicated that the yacht could capsize when the 
wind velocity exceeded a threshold. 
The yacht was rigged as sloop and has a 
cabin, fin keel, rudder and an outboard motor. 
The cabin had two openings, a companionway 
and a hole for ventilator on deck at bow. 
At the moment of the accident, the skipper 
failed to helm amidships and to release the 
main sheet from the cleat, causing a significant 
roll towards port side. One adult and one child 
situated on the starboard-side deck dropped 
onto the main sail, then the rest of the crew 
dropped into the water and the yacht 
completely capsized. Shortly after, the yacht 
started to re-right but its stern was under water 
due to flooding water. Initially the water 
entered into the cabin through an open hatch, 
and finally the yacht sunk from the stern. 
The loading condition at the moment of the 
accident reduced significantly the restoring 
moment because of the weight added by the 
crew. As a matter of fact the static stability in 
this condition can be regarded as insufficient 
(IMO). When the crew dropped into the water 
the static stability increased. 
Once the capsizing had occurred, the roll 
motion immediately stopped because of large 
roll damping.  
One significant result from the test 
(Umeda, 2006) was that when the wind speed 
was more than 10 m/s, additional heel could 
allow air egress, and water ingress. When the 
flooded water exceeded 2 m3, the yacht could 
start re-right. Trim by stern could occur 
because of the large amount of water, and the 
companionway could submerge. If bow hole 
was open, air egress through the hole and 
water ingress through the companionway 
could result in sinking of the yacht. 
Air flow required both the bow hole and 
the companionway to be open. In particular, in 
cases where the companionway was closed 
and the wind speed was strong enough, the 
model completely re-righted and sailed again. 
Therefore, when the wind speed increased, 
time-to-sink decreased.  
The measured wind speed at the accident 
exceeded the critical wind speed for capsizing 
and re-righting. Under this condition the static 
equilibrium existed but dynamic equilibrium 
did not. The roll angle exceeded the angle of 
vanishing stability and therefore capsizing 
could not be avoided. 
The results of the tests also showed that the 
relocation of the crew was not the primary 
cause of the accident. 
Trawler MFV “GAUL” 
In February 1974, the trawler MFV 
“GAUL” was lost in heavy seas off the North 
Cape of Norway. Its wreck was discovered in 
1997 and she had the lids of the duff and offal 
chutes open. The chutes are normally 
positioned on the starboard side of the vessel 
and serve to remove waste from the factory 
deck. After the investigation, it was concluded 
that the steering nozzle was at its maximum 
angle and the propeller was at a high pitch 
setting, indicating that the vessel was 
manoeuvring prior to sink. 
   
The research presented in the paper 
published in 2006 (van Walree 2006), focused 
on the results of investigations in to the 
dynamic stability of the Gaul in intact and 
partially flooded conditions. Their main 
objective was to asses the behaviour of the 
vessel in the sea state believed to be present at 
the time of the loss. The performance of the 
vessel was determined by means of model 
tests and numerical simulations 
A series of simulations with various 
flooding arrangements were carried out in 
order to obtain a more complete insight into 
the performance of the trawler in the 
conditions of the accident. Its purpose was to 
assess the susceptibility of capsizing and to 
measure the amount of water entering through 
the chutes and the factory space access door. 
The model, which showed rather good 
seakeeping characteristics in relation to the 
heavy sea generated, did not capsize during the 
tests. This result concluded that the vessel was 
not at risk in the intact condition. 
The initial results indicated that down 
flooding through the two chutes was 
substantial when the ship operated in beam to 
stern quartering seas and that progressive 
down flooding could have led to the capsizing. 
Down flooding showed a threshold 
character, which was crossed only under 
particular conditions during the simulations. 
Typical operability criteria based on 
acceleration components and roll angle were 
exceeded during virtually all test conditions, 
indicating that the performance of normal 
duties must have been very difficult for the 
crew. 
Combination of heading, speed and 
resulting water ingress could have been 
threatening to the survivability of the ship. 
Motor Vessel “RECHITSA” 
  The motor vessel “RECHITSA” tipped 
and sunk in November 26, 1976 at an exit to 
Mediterranean Sea. The vessel carried onboard 
a cargo of a steel rolled wire in coves, loaded 
by bulk in all eight cargo compartments. This 
is Elastically Movable Cargo. EMC, when 
being deformed or sprung down and aside, 
causes variations in the mass moment of 
inertia of the oscillatory system. The paper 
presented at this Conference (Vorobyov, 2006) 
analysed the stability and rolling of this vessel, 
loaded with elastically movable cargo. 
At her departure, the vessel met the 
stability requirements of the Register of 
Shipping of the USSR. The rolled wire in 
coves had never been mentioned in any 
official normative document as a cargo which 
is dangerous for ship stability conditions. 
Thus, no resolution existed regarding special 
measures to be taken during the loading of a 
vessel with EMC. 
The official investigation established that, 
when EMC cargo was steeped by bulk, 
residual deformations of compression and 
shifting were obtained. The properties of this 
type of cargo could result in significantly 
influence the stability of the vessel, this effect 
was strengthened, in the case of the accident, 
by the incomplete filling of the cargo 
compartments at loading, and the subsequent 
self-packing of cargo. At the moment of the 
accident more than 25% of the volume of total 
space in the upper part of the cargo 
compartments was empty. 
The results of the analysis had proved the 
necessity of taking into account change of 
mass moment of inertia for EMC in 
calculations of rolling for vessel with specific 
cargoes of EMC type. 
A vessel loaded with EMC possesses 
special dynamic properties to incoming waves 
when navigating in heavy seas. This is due to 
special properties of cargo, such as the 
fluctuation in the mass moment of inertia of a 
cargo that induces a parametric resonance of a 
vessel rolling; and appreciable changes on 
vertical position of the centre of gravity of the 
ship due to condensation and deformation of 
cargo. 
Under the same loading and wave 
conditions, the solution of traditional roll 
   
equation demonstrates a normal rolling 
process, while specialized equation regarding 
EMC properties shows the capsizing of the 
vessel. 
The results of this research indicated the 
vital necessity of adding to the known line of 
moving cargoes an additional one: elastically 
movable cargo. It was also remarked the 
necessity of supplying the navigators 
transporting this cargo with reliable regulating 
documents. 
“O BAHIA”, “NUEVO PILIN”  and 
“ENRIQUE EL MORICO”, small Fishing 
Vessels 
The paper presented (Perez-Rojas, 2006) 
described three similar accidents involving 
fishing vessels occurred in the coast of Spain. 
These casualties were analysed in order to 
shed some light in this type of accident in 
which the stability gets a very important role. 
The “O BAHIA”, already commented in 
other paper, sank at the Sisargas Islands in 
June 2, 2004. It drew to death six crewmen 
and other four disappeared. The “ENRIQUE 
EL MORICO” sank due to two successive sea 
strokes in August 3, 2004 at the Alboran Sea. 
The “NUEVO PILÍN” was lost in the 
Cantabric Sea in November 19, 2004. Three 
crewmen were dead and two more 
disappeared. 
The ship lines were very similar and a 
significant change on the predominant wave 
direction was detected in the 3 cases. 
All requirements regarding the stability 
were accomplished by the three ships, but in 
some cases very slightly. The stability values 
were recalculated and some significant 
differences had been found, these 
discrepancies mean that some stability criteria 
were not fulfilled. Both critical wave length 
and height considered by IMO are fulfilled in 
the three accidents.  
In order to evaluate the loss of stability on 
waves, some calculations were performed and 
the conclusion was that stability reductions 
due to waves were very significant. If these 
considerations with the waves were taken into 
account at the presumable accident loading 
and wave conditions, the likely cause for the 
casualties of the three ships presented in this 
paper could be a poor stability conditions and 
a very sensitive response to waves. 
WORKSHOP 2007 (Hamburg) 
MV “ESTONIA” 
The MV “ESTONIA” sank on September 
28, 1994 in the Baltic Sea on its way from 
Tallinn to Stockholm. At least, 852 human 
lives were lost in the accident.  
The Joint Accident Investigation 
Commission (JAIC) published its report in 
1997 but the discussion on the MV 
“ESTONIA” has not calmed down after all 
these years. Therefore, the Swedish 
Government authorized a new study in 2005. 
The paper described here, (Valanto,2007) gave 
information on the methods used in the on-
going HSVA investigation and on some first 
preliminary results. 
In this study, new ways to model the 
inflow-outflow from the vehicle deck have 
been applied, since it was believed crucial. 
An evacuation analysis would help to 
establish as complete picture of the MV 
“ESTONIA” accident as possible. The 
software AENEAS was used for simulations 
with the real ship population and the newly 
estimated ship’s list as a function of time. The 
differences between them were expected to be 
significant. This may help to develop the 
guidelines further. The evacuation analysis is 
still far from complete and was not reported 
further in that paper. 
A new time sequence of the course of the 
accident was established based on the 
survivors’ testimonies. This sequence of the 
ship’s list was one of the crucial facts to be 
reproduced with the motion simulation. 
It is known that the bow visor must have 
dropped in quite an early phase of the accident 
   
it pulled the ramp completely open. This 
conclusion have, however, been put into 
question by various interests groups working 
on the MV “ESTONIA”. In order to throw 
some light on this early phase of the accident, 
different cases were investigated. 
The accident scenario, according to the 
JAIC, was the one that assumes the ship 
navigating without the visor and with the ramp 
fully open.  
 
The JAIC considered that through the open 
ramp enormous amount of water flowed on to 
the vehicle deck and the ship heeled. However, 
the author agreed with the possibility that the 
sudden heel was not a consequence of wave 
forces or massive ingress of water, but a 
consequence of the ship starting to turn to port. 
A turn to port would bring the wind and the 
waves to the starboard side. This would have a 
straightening effect on the ship’s list. 
The water sloshing on the vehicle deck is 
likely to contribute to the magnitude of the 
sudden heeling motion. The inflow of water 
through the completely open bow increases 
due to the sudden heel. 
The simulation conclusions for the sudden 
heel were: 
• A sharp turn to port gives a plausible 
explanation to the sudden heeling 
motion of the ship reported by the 
survivors. 
• The amount of water on the vehicle 
deck, appears to contribute to the 
magnitude of the sudden heeling 
motion. 
 
The numerical computations showed how 
the water flowed from the open ramp to both 
sides of the central casing on the vehicle deck. 
The simulations revealed wild sloshing motion 
in the longitudinal direction when the ramp is 
fully open. 
The obtained results gave an improved 
picture of the early phases of the accident, but 
they were preliminary ones. The HSVA 
investigation was going on. 
A central point remarked in another paper 
on a plausible sinking scenario for the MV 
“ESTONIA” (Imstøl, 2007) was why the ship 
sunk by stern when the group of experts 
maintains water was up-flooding fairly far 
ahead. 
A possible similarity between the MV 
“ESTONIA” and the MV “AL SALAM 
BOCCACCIO 98” cases was established in 
this new paper. For both ships, it had to be 
explained how the buoyancy represented by 
the freeboard as well as the car deck was lost.  
The proposed scenario in this paper was as 
follows: at sometime during the evening of 
disaster, the pool-compartment, situated 
forward at the lower deck, started to leak. 
Flooding of the pool compartment would make 
the bow work harder and the pressure on the 
ramp would be higher than normal. As long as 
the trim was by stern, the ship could drain 
water from the car-deck by opening the rear 
ramp. However, sooner or later the ship would 
be likely to trim by head. Due to starboard heel 
and the gradient of the car-deck the starboard 
pilot door would become the lowest point of 
the car-deck and it would be the best option 
for additional drainage. 
The scenario presented in the mentioned 
paper seemed to be in harmony with most 
witness observations and it should be 
considered plausible until it has been proven 
impossible by detailed simulations. 
SS Fidamus ,MV Lohengrin, SS Irene 
Oldendorff and MV Finnbirch  
The paper presented by Kluwe (Kluwe 
2007) analysed a number of real capsizing 
accidents, which were related to poor stability 
in rough weather, showing that numerical 
simulations are suitable to identify safe and 
un-safe conditions clearly for specific ships. 
On January 31, 1950 the 743 BRT vessel 
SS “FIDAMUS” capsized in heavy weather 
bound from Wismar to Antwerp close to 
   
Langeoog.The vessel suddenly heeled to more 
than 30 degrees and remained there. Water 
ingress then lead to capsizing within 10 
minutes. 
The ship did not carry ballast although this 
was strongly recommended in the stability 
booklet. 
The numerical simulations carried out with 
the program E4-ROLLS showed that the 
vessel was permanently rolling with a 
maximum angle of 45 degrees. As the static 
angle of vanishing stability in still water 
conditions was beyond 90 degrees, it was 
theoretically not possible to capsize the vessel 
without any additional heeling moment. Also, 
a significant amount of water was entrapped 
between hatchway coming and bulwark, which 
produced a sufficient heeling moment to keep 
the ship at a steady list. 
On January 14, 1950 the 955 BRT vessel 
MV “LOHENGRIN” capsized in heavy 
weather bound from Iggesund to Kiel. The 
waves encountered the vessel from abaft. The 
vessel heeled to 40-45 degrees starboard side 
and remained there with a steady list of the 
same size. The ship finally capsized one hour 
and a half later. 
The numerical simulations clearly showed 
that the reason for the loss of this ship could be 
consistently explained by insufficient stability 
and a pure loss on the crest situation. 
  On December 31, 1951 the vessel SS 
“IRENE OLDENDORFF” capsized in heavy 
weather bound from Emden to Ystad in the 
Hubert Gat. 
The simulation-based analysis showed that 
the reason for the loss of the ship could be 
consistently explained as an intact stability in 
extreme weather conditions. The loss of 
stability in the particular situation could be 
clearly related to water entrapped in the coke 
deck cargo, which could not drain off fast 
enough through the freeing ports. 
On November 1, 2006 the 8500 dwt Ro-Ro 
ferry MV “FINNBIRCH” capsized in heavy 
weather in the Baltic Sea between the islands 
Gothland and Olland. The vessel was loaded 
with trailers, of which a significant amount 
was stowed on the top deck. 
The ship was rolling significantly and 
heeled to about 50 degrees. The vessel 
remained in that intermediate equilibrium 
floating condition for a while until she 
capsized three hours later. 
The official accident investigation has not 
been finished yet, therefore no investigation 
report is available so far. 
The final conclusion that paper established 
was that the current stability criteria neither 
sufficient not suitable to avoid accidents 
related to stability alteration in waves. 
“O BAHIA” and “ENRIQUE EL MORICO” 
small fishing vessels. 
The capsizing of this two fishing vessels 
took place in the year 2004 in front of the 
Spanish coast. The investigation carried out by 
the CEHIPAR and the CEHINAV (Perez 
Rojas, 2007) was the continuation of the 
experiments performed in 2006 (Maron, 2006) 
which could not be completed because of the 
scale of the model. 
The purpose of the experiments was to find 
how the mentioned ships sank and if the 
stability regulations for these types of vessels 
were appropriate. The “O BAHIA” was a 
purse seiner built in steel the year 1999. The 
“ENRIQUE EL MORICO” was a long liner 
built in FRP, the year 1999. Both boats are 
representative of the Spanish fishing vessels 
fleet, so, the analysis of their accidents was 
relevant. 
Free running tests had been performed in 
regular waves with the models reproducing the 
accident´s loading condition, but within the 
regulation of watertightness.  
It was nearly impossible to lead the models 
to capsizing, in spite the rough conditions 
studied, and the barely fulfilment of the 
   
stability criteria that these boats had at the 
moment of their accidents. 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Several papers dealing with ship accidents 
presented to different STAB events have been 
presented. 
In general, there are not conclusive 
findings but in many cases feasible hypothesis 
can explain what happened. 
Many situations point out that although the 
fulfilment of the IMO criteria was quite poor, 
the intact stability was enough even with 
extreme sea conditions. The watertighness of 
access,  doors and openings  were not kept. 
The numerical calculations in the new 
reports can simulate adequately the capsizing 
scenarios. The experimental simulation is not 
the only way of accident investigation. 
The accidents occurrence shown that the 
present regulations and practices can be 
improved   
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